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When National Courts go to Europe. 
Reluctant or active players 
in the integrationprocess? 
 
 
Dorte S. Martinsen & Marlene Wind1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is not an exaggeration to say that Hjalte Rasmussen opened the eyes of 
many Danish political scientists to the role of courts in the study of Europe. 
Rasmussen’s now legendary dissertation “On Law and Policy in the Europe-
an Court of Justice”,2 from 1986, and his many law textbooks had a strong 
appeal to political scientists interested in the interplay between law and poli-
tics in the European Union. Rasmussen’s work on the European Court of Jus-
tice described how courts in general should be taken seriously as political ac-
tors, and by employing the so-called “law in context approach” to the study 
of law and courts, he refused to see law as an isolated island far removed 
from political predispositions.  Today, the law in context school has become 
almost mainstream – at least outside Scandinavia – and thus the point about 
courts’ political power may no longer seem so controversial. However, many 
factors suggest that the issue of courts (including national courts) as im-
portant political players continues to fly in the face of many lawyers as well 
as political scientists in the Nordic countries3. The point of departure for this 
 
1
 Dorte S. Martinsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Universi-
ty of Copenhagen. Marlene Wind is Professor of Law and Politics in the Department of Po-
litical Science, University of Copenhagen.  
2
 H. Rasmussen, ‘On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice’, (1986), Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers Group.  
3
 We refer here to Denmark, Sweden, Finland and to some degree Norway. Despite the fact 
that Norway represents the odd man out in a Nordic context, as Norway was one of the first 
countries in Europe to have a constitutional court, criticism of courts political power (e.g. 
judicial activism) and international courts, such as Strasbourg and Luxembourg, has been 
quite significant in Norway in the past 10 to 15 years. In particular, the government spon-
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contribution will be a more fundamental discussion of the role of courts in 
democracy. Our recent research shows that not only lawyers but also political 
scientists in the Nordic countries have had great difficulties accepting the 
view – so well known from, for instance, the US and other European coun-
tries – that courts can (and should) play a central role as active protectors of 
fundamental rights, including rights pertaining to EU membership. From this 
perspective, courts not only reflect what has been decided in parliament but 
are – and should be – societal actors themselves. Or to put it differently, ac-
cording to this view, when (national as well as supranational) courts are “non-
activist” – to use a phrase often employed by Hjalte Rasmussen – judges are 
making a political choice nonetheless. And by making such a choice, they de 
facto take part in a political game which is far from innocent and which de-
serves serious scientific scrutiny. In other words, when a Danish court de-
cides not to forward a case to the ECJ through the preliminary ruling proce-
dure, it is a choice, which may be influenced by factors other than a simple 
legal analysis. Recent research shows that it often will be influenced by other 
factors even at a sub-conscious level as reflected in societies’ legal and politi-
cal culture. For anyone seeing courts as mere reflections of what is decided 
by a majority in parliament – a mere “bouche de la loi” of what politicians 
have decided – this is clearly thought provoking. However, building on our 
previous work, we will argue that while addressing specific legal questions, 
courts are – and should be – also analysed as collective actors embedded in 
society and influenced by a specific legal and political history and culture. 
Because courts and judges in this perspective are much more than just ma-
chines which process and interpret legislative acts, it must be of scientific rel-
evance – both for lawyers and for political scientists – to try to explain how 
national courts interact with international courts. It must thus also be highly 
relevant to understand why national courts from different member states may 
be more or less interested in asking the European Court of Justice for its in-
terpretation of EU law through the preliminary reference mechanism.  
 While a legal dogmatic perspective would argue that only narrow legal 
doctrine influences the decision of whether a national court should refer a 
case to the ECJ or not, our analysis shows that looking at other intervening 
variables is essential in order to explain why variance exists in the first place. 
In sum, if the driving force behind a court’s decision to ask the ECJ for help 
when interpreting European Union law rested on narrow legal doctrine alone, 
the variance in reference patterns among member state courts would be insig-
                                                                                                                            
sored power analysis (‘Makt og demokratiutredningen’) from 2003 focused on the alleged 
transfer of power from elected politicians to the courts. See also Ø. Østerud & P. Selle 2006.   
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nificant. However, as our studies have shown, variance does exist and de-
serves – at least from a social science perspective – to be explained.4  
 Before we present a summary of our examination of variance in national 
courts’ reference practice, let us take a brief look at the underlying and much 
broader question of what role courts ought to play in society and democracy 
in general. This debate is far from new, but has influenced legal philosophy 
and political theory for centuries. It is, however, essential to rehearse the 
competing views again here, partly because they often seem to be forgotten in 
the fierce Danish debate on the role and influence of supranational courts5; 
but also partly in order to avoid a simplistic criticism of court activism and 
judicial review and in particular an uncritical celebration of unconstrained 
majoritarian democracy, which has been dominant in a Danish and Nordic 
context.   
 
2. Law, politics and courts 
 
How should one situate the role of courts in a democratic society? Do they – 
as unelected bodies – fit in at all? The classical question of the legitimacy of 
unelected judges conducting judicial review over an elected political majority 
has been prominent as far back as the earliest writers on democracy. The 
basic question – even today – and certainly also in relation to the ECJ and 
other international courts is: should the parliament be sovereign and without 
limits in the sense of not having to subject itself to some kind of review 
mechanism by courts? Should politicians themselves be trusted to protect 
fundamental rights as some theorists6 (and certainly politicians) claim, or do 
we need independent courts for that? Are courts better than politicians to do 
the job?7 In this context it may also be highly relevant to ask whether there is 
(or should be) a difference between the review power of national and supra-
national/international courts? To put it differently, if we – as in the Danish 
case – have no tradition for national judicial review, can we then accept judi-
cial review of national legislation by international courts? This is in a nutshell 
 
4
 M. Wind, D. S. Martinsen & G. P. Rotger, ‘The Uneven Legal Push for Europe’, (2009) 
European Union Politics 10(1) and M. Wind, ’The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance To-
wards Supernational Judicial Review’, (2010), Journal of Common Market Studies 48(4). 
5
 J. Christoffersen & M. Rask Madsen, Menneskerettighedsdomstolen – 50 års samspil med 
dansk ret og politik, (2009).  
6
 Robert Dahl, Democracy and its critics, New Haven: Yale University Press, (1989), pp. 
154-159. 
7
 See “Symposium: An exchange with Jeremy Waldron” in ICON (International Journal of 
Constitutional Law) 2009 vol. 7, no 4. 
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the Danish dilemma. We have no practice in letting our own national courts 
set aside national legislation (at least it has only happened once in 160 years 
in the so-called Tvind case), but by being part of both the EU and the ECHR, 
we have de facto subjected ourselves to judicial review by two strong interna-
tional courts.   
 Though this discussion may seem trivial to some, it is certainly vibrant 
when looking at the Danish debate in recent years8, where not only the role of 
international courts but equally the role of national courts are intensely dis-
cussed. The still unsettled issue of the judicial dialogue between the member 
state courts and the ECJ thus illustrates and underscores the continuing rele-
vance of this philosophical discussion. Looking at this from a theoretical per-
spective, not only lawyers and legal philosophers have shown an interest in 
this debate. Another voice in the discussion on the role of courts in democra-
cy has been that of the prominent and highly influential American political 
scientist Robert Dahl. In his view, a true democracy should as a principle not 
subject itself to any kind of judicial review by courts. As he boldly puts it: 
“No one has shown that countries…which lack judicial review…are less 
democratic...”.9 This also goes for the protection of fundamental rights, which 
of course has been the most prominent reason for having courts with strong 
review powers. In fact, according to Dahl, majoritarian democracies are per-
fectly capable of protecting fundamental rights without the help of judges. As 
he argues, democracies with judicial review to protect minorities and funda-
mental rights often get lazy:  “Over time, the political culture may come to 
incorporate the expectation that the judicial guardians can be counted on to 
fend off violations of fundamental rights”.10 According to Dahl, this will 
make politicians less attentive to their own responsibilities. In sum, in Dahl’s 
view elected politicians may even be better than judges for protecting funda-
mental rights!  
 Though Dahl’s faith in the formal democratic process is provocative in its 
boldness, it is a well-known and even dominant view among Danish lawyers, 
judges and politicians. In fact, this understanding has been part and parcel of 
 
8
 J. E. Rytter & M. Wind ’In need of Juristocracy? The silence of Denmark in the develop-
ment of international legal norms’ (2010), under review in International Journal of Constitu-
tional Law.  
9
 N. 6 Dahl, (1989), 189. 
10
 Ibid.; see also R. Hirschl, ‘Towards Juristocracy: The origins and consequences of the 
new constitutionalism’, (2004), 3-5; R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican 
Defense of the Constitutionality of Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , 
(2007), 145-176. 
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a common Nordic11 heritage for at least two centuries – more specifically 
since these modern democracies acquired their formal democratic constitu-
tions.12 In the Danish concept of democracy parliament comes first13 in the 
sense of being elevated above the other branches of governing power. Majori-
ty rule (even in its formal minority government version)14 has thus been the 
closest you could get to an ideal type of democracy.15 As Jens Elo Rytter has 
suggested: 
 
“Common to the constitutional tradition of the Nordic countries…there is an emphasis on 
the preferred position of Parliament in the constitutional power structure, based on its demo-
cratic mandate through elections. The courts have no similar democratic mandate and there-
fore, the judicial review of legislation is either problematic in principle or should at least be 
kept within rather narrow limits” 16 
 
Thus, when the Danish Supreme Court in 192117 applied its version of “judi-
cial self-restraint” it underscored a constitutional need for the courts to refer 
to the legislator – in this manner legitimizing that in a democracy it is the ma-
jority in parliament which prevails over the judiciary due to its lack of demo-
cratic mandate.18 Danish courts have no doubt conducted self-restraint over 
the years and continue to do so. As Rytter and Wind writes:  
 
“Generally speaking, it (self-restraint) means that whenever judicial review is undertaken on 
the basis of broad and imprecise constitutional provisions like for instance human rights, 
which often have this character of being broad legal principles, the courts should give signif-
icant leeway or margin to the assessment of the legislator, recognising the direct democratic 
 
11
 Again Norway may be seen as an exception, but as described above, in the past decade, 
the democracy debate in Norway has been centred exactly on the role and excessive power 
of (international) courts. 
12
 H. Palmer Olsen, Magtfordeling: En analyse af magtfordelingslæren med særligt henblik 
på den lovgivende magt (2005) 
13
 M. Wind, ‘When Parliament Comes First – the Danish concept of democracy meets the 
European Union’, (2009) Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 272-289.  
14
 In order to have majority rule, you do not need to have a majority government as long as 
you have a majority in parliament. 
15
 T. Knudsen, Dansk Statsbygning [Danish State-Building] (1995). 
16
 J. E. Rytter ‘Grundrettigheder som almene retsprincipper‘, (2001), Juristen 83(4), 138. 
17
 Upholding an act of parliament concerning landownership reform, the Supreme Court sta-
ted that the citizen’s claim that the act had not provided full compensation for his loss of 
property could not be affirmed: “with the certainty which is required for the courts to set 
aside an act of Parliament as unconstitutional” (here cited from Rytter & Wind 2010, 
forthcoming). 
18
 See also Henning Koch, ‘Dansk forfatningsret i transnational belysning’ [Danish constitu-
tional Law in a transnational perspective], (1999), Juristen, 217. 
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mandate of the latter. More precisely, judicial self-restraint means that, vis-à-vis the legisla-
tor, a court should not insist in every detail on its own final say as to the specific contents of 
broad constitutional norms”
19
 
 
The idea of self-restraint is moreover in good correspondence with the domi-
nance in Danish legal thinking of legal realism and the antipathy of any kind 
of natural law elements as legal sources.20 However, if the ultimate source of 
law is not the constitution, not international human rights and principles, but 
what the legislator decides in (the national) parliament, it becomes an uneasy 
task for Danish judges to respect and thus refer cases of interpretation to the 
ECJ (or to the Court of Human rights in Strasbourg for that matter).  
 In our ongoing research we argue that this explains, better than most other 
theories, why not only Danish courts and judges but equally the political en-
vironment and the executive handling Denmark’s relations with foreign pow-
ers such as international courts have been hesitant to refer cases to interna-
tional courts such as the ECJ.21 Few have described the challenge of Danish 
courts better than the former Danish President of the Supreme Court Niels 
Pontoppidan: 
 
“The development since the Second World War has strongly reduced the importance of the 
lawmaker as the most important source of law and legitimation. It simply no longer covers 
legal realities sufficiently”22  
 
The summery of our analysis of Danish courts’ reference practice to the ECJ 
which follows below, illustrates – we think – very well the ongoing challenge 
to Danish legal and political culture that Pontoppidan refers to above. 
 
3. The divergent reference patterns of national courts 
 
Due to the Danish embracement of what Ronald Dworkin has named majori-
tarian democracy with the lawmaker at the centre, Danish courts – and in-
deed the public administration maintaining the Danish relationship with the 
 
19
 N. 8 J. E. Rytter & M. Wind supra 6, p. 5. 
20
 M. Scheinin, The Welfare State and Constitutionalism in the Nordic Countries, (2001); J. 
E. Rytter, Grundrettigheder. Domstolenes fortolkning og kontrol med lovgivningsmagten 
(2000); see also N. 8 Rytter & Wind (2010). 
21
 M. Wind, ’The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance Towards Supranational Judicial Re-
view’, (2010), Journal of Common Market Studies 48(4) pp. 1041-1065; see also N. 8 Rytter 
& Wind (2010). 
22
 Niels Pontoppidan - then President of the Supreme Court - in an interview in the Danish 
journal Weekendavisen 28 June 1996, p. 11. 
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European Union – have not been too eager to send cases to the ECJ for inter-
pretation. The preliminary ruling system, which was introduced into the Un-
ion with the treaty of Rome in 1957 (then art. 177) and which requires courts 
and tribunals to refer cases to the ECJ if in doubt about the interpretation of 
EU law, thus introduces a judicial review mechanism fundamentally foreign 
to Danish legal and political tradition.23 Though aware of other explanations, 
we argue that for a political and legal culture with no tradition of judicial re-
view, it is clearly counter-intuitive to ask a court to evaluate what a Danish 
lawmaker (and administration) has decided when implementing EU law into 
Danish law. What makes this whole relationship even ‘worse’, is that we on 
top of that are dealing with a supranational court which do not reveal dissent-
ing votes and which employs a very dynamic style of legal interpretation.24 
The political control with the courts, which is common (but implicit and cer-
tainly never discussed) in a Nordic context, is thus nonexistent in the Europe-
an system. The EU’s preliminary ruling mechanism in this manner not only 
introduces judicial review into a Danish legal and political system which ex-
plicitly and consistently has rejected judicial review by national courts, but it 
also introduces collaboration with a constitutional judicial system that even 
celebrates legal activism (e.g. a dynamic style of interpretation), and which 
confronts the Danish ”self-restraint” philosophy head on.   
 To refer cases to the ECJ when in doubt of the interpretation of EU law is, 
nevertheless, the cornerstone in the EU constitutional order.25 In order to 
make sure that the EU’s legal system develops in a harmonious and uncon-
tradictory manner, it is (and has always been) essential that national courts 
willingly and without any kind of strategic considerations engage in an ongo-
ing dialogue with the ECJ. One can also argue that the ability of the ECJ to 
enhance and define the scope of European integration depends on national 
courts’ willingness to bring preliminary references before it. In a long-term as 
well as a contemporary perspective, national courts – in the EU as a whole – 
have indeed accepted and taken up that role.26 Below we will take a closer 
look at the long-time span statistics in order to put the Danish case into per-
spective. First of all, however, we will look at the general trends.  
 
23
 N. 4 Wind, Martinsen & Rotger (2009); and N. 8 Rytter & Wind (2010) 
24
 N. 2 Rasmussen (1986). 
25
 J. H. H Weiler, ’The Transformation of Europe’, (1991), The Yale Law Journal 100: 
2403-2483. 
26
 K. J. Alter, ‘The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or 
Backlash?’, (2000) International Organizations 54(3): 489–518; see also K. J. Alter, Estab-
lishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an International Rule of Law in Eu-
rope. (2001) Oxford University Press. 
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Trend in total number of preliminary references (art. 267) 1961-2008 
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 Our data below thus confirm that Article 267 (previously art. 234 and art. 
177) references continued to increase significantly between 1961, when the 
first preliminary reference was forwarded to the Court, and 2008.  
 
Figure 127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The more recent figures in our data confirm this historical trend. By the end 
of 2008, 6317 preliminary references had been made to the ECJ. From 1993 
onwards, more than 200 references were made annually, with a maximum of 
288 references in 2008. The interplay between national courts and the ECJ is 
indeed a growth factor on its own in the European integration process.   
 However, our data also confirm that national courts do not participate to 
equal degrees. Some do appear more reluctant to refer questions to the Euro-
pean judiciary, and one of the most pronounced characteristic behind the ag-
gregated trend illustrated above is the important heterogeneity across member 
states (see Figure 2).  
 
 
27
 Own data elaborated on the basis of: The Annual Report 2008, The Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (2008). 
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Figure 228 
It is clear, however, that the heterogeneity in the total number of references 
per member state may be attributed to various factors. Membership period 
seems to play a role, as Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands 
have had the highest number of references, whereas the later arriving EU-12 
member states for the most part have made much fewer. If we take year of 
membership into account, heterogeneity is however still significant, as Figure 
3 demonstrates. 
 
Figure 329 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28
 Ibid.  
29
 Ibid. Years of membership is calculated between 1957 and 2008.   
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It has been argued that population size may in part explain the heterogeneity 
across member states’ reference practice.30 However, when controlling for 
the different population sizes, the variance across member states is still re-
markable. Although the picture of the member states’ reference practice is 
now a different one, in previous work we have demonstrated that there is no 
causality between population size and preliminary reference practice.31 In po-
litical science terminology, this means that population size cannot explain the 
different number of preliminary references that come from any individual 
country. A very good example of this is apparent when we compare Austria 
and Sweden. They entered the EU the same year – in 1995 – and have on av-
erage the same population size; however, when looking at the figures, it is 
clear that Austria has referred more than four times the number of cases than 
Sweden has.  
 To put it differently, differences in population sizes do not explain why 
some member states refer more cases than others. After all, individuals trying 
to make their case before the ECJ have a long, tiring and troubled way to go 
before reaching the ECJ. In sum, the absence of causality between population 
size and preliminary references substantiates the need to take a closer look at 
other explanatory factors in order to better understand differences and simi-
larities in the interplay between the EU and national courts. Above, when de-
scribing the Danish case, we pointed out how legal and democratic culture 
may explain the hesitance to make use of the preliminary reference proce-
dure. However, the democratic culture explanatory framework has never pre-
viously been employed as an explanatory factor in studies of preliminary ref-
erences. Rather, the most influential explanations launched by political scien-
tists studying variance in reference patterns have been general theories relat-
ing to macro factors, such as the amount of trade among countries and court 
competition.32 
 
3.1 Explaining national legal push for integration  
Existing studies examining the relationship between law and politics in the 
EU have provided very different explanations for why national courts have 
 
30
 N. Fenger, ’Om danske domstoles relative tilbøjelighed til at forelægge præjudicielle 
spørgsmål for EU-domstolen’, (2009) Juristen.  
31
 N. 4 Wind, Martinsen & Rotger (2009), 79. 
32
 A. Stone Sweet and T. L. Brunell, ‘Constructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute 
Resolution and Governance in the European Community’, (1998) American Political Sci-
ence Review 92(1); see also J. Golub, ‘The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the In-
teraction between National Courts and the European Court of Justice’, (1996b) West Euro-
pean Politics 19(2). 
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participated in the legal constitutionalisation of Europe. One of the explanato-
ry variables suggested in prior studies is whether interest groups are active 
within a policy area, and thus help with resources to push cases to the ECJ.33 
The litigiousness of individual societies is another explanatory factor. That is, 
are courts in general used to solve societal conflicts – do citizens see it as 
natural to go to court?34 A third explanation concerns national legal education 
and judicial learning. How well educated are national judges – do they know 
enough about EU law and the working of international courts?35 A fourth 
(and quite prominent) explanation is judicial competition: whether national 
judges especially from lower courts see a strategic advantage in addressing 
the European court level and thus by-pass their national legal hierarchy.36 
 All these factors are highly plausible for explaining the reference practices 
of individual countries or within different policy sectors. This means, without 
doubt, that a varied and dynamic mix of factors is likely to explain diverse 
reference practices. What seems unlikely is that there is one general theory or 
one main cause which can explain all situations. However, influential Ameri-
can scholars have exactly launched such general explanatory frameworks 
seeking to explain which general mechanisms can foresee reference patterns 
in all countries. Stone Sweet and Brunell, for instance, claim that the rise in 
preliminary references can be predicted by a rise in transnational activity, 
measured as intra EC trade.37 They argue that the more trade between coun-
tries the more cases will be referred to the ECJ by national courts – clearly 
because more trade will imply more conflicts and more EU legal disputes to 
be solved. Our previous work, however, has not found any support for this 
causal relationship even though Denmark as a small open economy is trading 
significantly with other states. In Denmark, the high trade flow has not lead to 
 
33
 K. J. Alter & J. Vargas, ‘Explaining Variation in the Use of European Litigation Strate-
gies’, (2000), Comparative Political Studies 33(4); see also L. Conant (2001) ‘Europeaniza-
tion and the Courts: Variable Patterns of Adaptation among National Judiciaries’, in Maria 
G. Cowles, James Caposaso and Thomas Risse (eds) Transforming Europe – Europeaniza-
tion and Domestic Change, London: Cornell University Press; see also N. 26 Alter (2000). 
34
 N. 26 Alter (2000). 
35
 J. Golub, ‘Modelling Judicial Dialogue in the European Community: The Quantitative 
Basis of Preliminary References to the ECJ’, (1996a), EUI Working Paper RSC, No. 96/58; 
see also N. 26 Alter (2000) 
36
 J. Golub, ‘The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the Inter- action between Na-
tional Courts and the European Court of Justice’, (1996b), West European Politics 19(2); see 
also N. 26 Alter (2000) & Alter (2001). 
37
N. 32, See Stone Sweet and Brunell, ‘Contructing a Supranational Constitution: Dispute 
Resolution and Governance in the European Community’, American Political Science Re-
view (1998), vol. 92, no. 1: 63-81. 
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more preliminary references. The fact that an otherwise obvious case like 
Denmark does not fit into Stone Sweet’s model made us hypothesise that type 
of democracy might be a much more solid explanatory factor (Wind, Martin-
sen & Rotger 2009).  
 There is little doubt that the institutional features that structure the relation-
ship between law and politics differ between democratic traditions in the EU 
member states. Following Ronald Dworkin38 (as well as Richard Bellamy 
200739) we may divide the European landscape into two different democratic 
traditions which have shaped the role of the courts and the role of the legisla-
ture in fundamentally different ways; majoritarian and constitutional democ-
racy.  
 Briefly, majoritarian democracy is a well-established tradition in all of the 
Nordic countries except perhaps Norway, which was the first European coun-
try to have a constitutional court. However, as noted in a footnote above – 
even in Norway the critique of courts and constitutionalism has been promi-
nent in recent years – in particular in the government sponsored ”Power and 
Democracy” report from 2004. The overall concern here was the fear that 
courts would take over at the expense of political institutions.40 The United 
Kingdom would also fall into this category of majoritarian democracies. Ma-
joritarian democracies are based on the idea of parliamentary supremacy. The 
parliament is the primary power in and above all other governance struc-
tures.41 The role of the courts in conducting judicial review is thus limited or 
entirely absent in practice in majoritarian systems. This does not mean, how-
ever, that judicial review cannot be a formal right which is mentioned in the 
constitution. The point we are trying to make here is that judicial review is 
not practiced and only considered legitimate in extreme cases.42  For this rea-
son, it has become commonplace to view constitutional and majoritarian de-
mocracy as almost incommensurable: “The ideal of limited government, or 
constitutionalism, is in conflict with the idea of parliamentary sovereignty”.43 
Parliamentary governance systems are moreover founded upon the notion 
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39
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that parliamentary majorities represent the ”will of the people” and that such 
majorities should not be subject to judicial review.44 Courts are therefore re-
garded as a “counter-majoritarian” force because they place the protection of 
rights and civil liberties by the courts above “the will of the people”.45 
 Although most majoritarian democracies have constitutions laying down 
the balance of power principle (at least formally) and as mentioned above 
even some kind of weak review, it has not been practice that courts challenge 
or actively review legislation in accordance with the constitution.46 As noted, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the UK all have roots in this tradition.47 In 
the UK, there is no written constitution, and the idea of parliamentary sover-
eignty has always been extremely strong.48 Accordingly, the courts have had 
almost no powers of legislative review and have generally regarded them-
selves as “la bouches de la loi”; loyal primarily to the executive and the dem-
ocratically elected majority.49 EU membership in principle challenged the di-
vision of labour between law and politics in the UK. However, British courts 
did not explicitly accept the supremacy of EU law before the Factortame 
judgement in 1990, and preliminary references were simply not made during 
the first decade of membership.50 Long established institutional traditions 
thus resisted adaptation to a new supranational context for a long time. In 
Finland, the judicial review of legislation was directly forbidden up until a 
very recent amendment to the constitution in 2000.51 In Sweden, the review 
of legislation is formally allowed but almost never practiced. In Denmark, the 
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constitution is silent on the issue and Danish courts have – as noted above – 
set aside legislation only once in the past 160 years.52 Moreover, the majori-
tarian paradigm in the Nordic countries has cultivated “… a corps of judges 
who are unusually loyal to the legislator, never questioning his wisdom and 
not perceiving its task as protecting the rights of the individual against the 
state”.53 Moreover, as judges perceive themselves as neutral and apolitical 
civil servants there is little doubt that the entire European development – in 
the EU as well as the European human rights regime guided by the Court in 
Strasbourg – has been perceived with great unease and great suspicion. These 
courts are doing everything that a Nordic judge has been taught not to do. 
 Constitutional democracy takes a different route. It is first and foremost an 
American invention, which only gradually came to influence a number of Eu-
ropean countries after World War II. Constitutional democracies generally 
embrace judicial review and view it as a constitutive aspect of what it means 
to be a true democracy. Supranational judicial review at the European level is 
therefore perceived as a natural extension of national practice; not as a threat. 
Theoretical as well as descriptive literature has recently described some very 
general trends characterizing constitutional democracies in Europe and else-
where.54 These studies often emphasise that judicial review became a reality 
in Europe after World War II when the defeated powers, Germany and Italy, 
adopted the institution in order to better protect fundamental rights. In reality, 
there is of course great variation in the manner in which judicial review was 
institutionalised in different European countries.55 Research suggests, howev-
er, that historical/institutional factors such as court structure, mon-
ism/dualism, and experience with dictatorship and/or communist rule influ-
ence the emphasis countries place on judicial review and the need for limiting 
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parliamentary power.56 Moreover, as Martin Shapiro has pointed out, coun-
tries which conduct judicial review are often (but not always) organized 
along federalist lines.57 The US and Germany are good examples of federalist 
states in this category. However, Australia and Canada are unitary states and 
still have a judicial review system,58 so the emphasis should rather – he ar-
gues – be put on the presence of an explicit division of powers element. Hav-
ing some kind of division of powers system (sometimes combined with fed-
eralism) may thus better explain the acceptance of a judicial review system. 
Another hypothesis is the rights hypothesis which may supplement the divi-
sion of powers hypothesis. As Shapiro points out: “Those polities which first 
adopted judicial review did so because of division of powers. Rights concerns 
engendered recent judicial review…. Most probable: a conjunction of divi-
sion of powers and rights concerns is most likely to generate successful re-
view”.59 The interesting thing here, however, is that Denmark and indeed the 
other Nordic countries traditionally have been very rarely occupied with ei-
ther division of powers or fundamental rights.60 Courts have thus not been 
preoccupied with protecting such rights. Rather, the state has been regarded 
as an all embracing entity protecting the individual from “cradle to grave”.61 
With little focus on the protection of citizen’s basic rights there has thus been 
little incentive for Danish courts to actively test the Danish state’s administra-
tion of EU law implementation. Moreover, due to the recruitment pattern to 
the Danish courts where the majority of judges (despite a judicial reform to 
change this in 2000) are still recruited from the Ministry of Justice, judges 
will often be more loyal to the state apparatus and to the political establish-
ment than to the basic (EU) rights of citizens. 
 
4. Danish Courts: Reluctant European players?  
 
As a European Community member since 1973, Denmark has had considera-
ble time to accustom itself to European ways and manners, not least the Eu-
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ropean legal system. Denmark is, however, often referred to as “the dutiful 
pupil in the class” when it comes to formal implementation of EU legislation. 
This is no doubt a correct description. It is, however, also correct – as Hagel 
Sørensen has pointed out – that the reason for Denmark’s high and fast im-
plementation frequence concerning EU legislative acts is due to the fact that 
these can be executed administratively. In other EU member states, Italy for 
instance, the delegation from the legislative to the administrative branch is 
subject to much stricter constitutional procedures, which clearly influences 
how fast and vivid the implementation of EU law can be processed.62 Regar-
ding sufficient implementation in practice, Denmark does, however, not al-
ways live up to its reputation as a good pupil.63 
 Returning to the role and impact of the Danish courts, however, there is lit-
tle doubt that institutional features and legal culture continuously impact and 
structure their relationship to the ECJ. The findings presented in figures 2 and 
3 above indicate that Denmark is one of the member states that has made 
fewer preliminary references to the ECJ; a total of 122 between 1973 and 
2008 or an average of 3.39 cases per year of membership.  
 It has been pointed out that the preliminary reference procedure in Den-
mark is in part conditioned by an extraordinarily close relationship with the 
executive branch (the Ministry of Justice and Foreign Affairs) and the Danish 
courts.64 Historically, there has always been a close relationship between the 
Ministry of Justice and the national courts. Until 1999, Danish judges were 
exclusively recruited from the Ministry of Justice, and the loyalty to this ex-
ecutive body remains almost unchallenged (Interviews, Danish judges and 
civil servants, March 2006).65 This in part explains why the so-called Judicial 
Committee plays an influential role when it comes to preliminary references. 
In his study, Pagh demonstrates how the Judicial Committee not only advises 
the Danish courts through the attorney of the Danish state by participating in 
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the selection and drafting of 267-questions (formerly art. 234) but also that 
many of the same people from the committee advice the government in the 
implementation of EU law.66  
 As there is no tradition for the judicial review of legislation in Denmark, 
the preliminary reference procedure has been regarded – in most cases – as an 
unnecessary foreign element interfering in matters which may be dealt with 
by the national court system itself.67 Danish courts have thus repeatedly in-
voked the acte claire doctrine, and thus avoided asking the ECJ for clarifica-
tion.  
 Our research shows that because of its many overlapping and occasionally 
contradictory tasks, the Judicial Committee will have little incentive to sug-
gest the national court (through the Danish attorney) to make a preliminary 
reference. A comprehensive survey conducted amongst all Danish judges in 
the winter of 2006 on this issue confirmed that one of the main reasons for 
the low number of preliminary references was discouragement from the legal 
adviser to the Danish government based on a so-called “responsa” by the 
Committee.68 Asked specifically about the main reason for not making any 
(or very few) preliminary references, an overwhelming 69% referred to dis-
couragement from the state attorney. According to Pagh the involvement of 
the Judicial Committee is the most convincing single explanatory factor for 
the low number of referrals from Danish courts since Denmark became a 
member of the European Community. Pagh’s own study shows that from 
1986 to 2003, the Judicial Committee has recommended not referring a case 
to the ECJ in 20 out of 26 cases, even though all 26 cases dealt with the inter-
pretation of EU law and at least one of the parties had requested an interpreta-
tion by the ECJ.69 Generally speaking, the Judicial Committee has only rec-
ommended Danish courts to make preliminary references in those cases 
where there is already direct action being taken against Denmark by the 
Commission.70 Whereas the Judicial Committee is “just doing its job” that is 
advising the one party in a case – the Danish government – it is perhaps more 
puzzling that the Danish courts treat this advice as “the highest legal exper-
tise” – as one of the judges in our interviews put it. However, being brought 
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up in the Ministry of Justice themselves, most judges may feel inclined to 
take advice from this source very seriously. 
 Moreover, in the literature it is often argued that the highest courts (and 
constitutional courts in general) are expected to be least eager to subject 
themselves to an authority outside of the national legal order.71 The lower 
courts, on the other hand, have always been expected to refer most cases as a 
means of revolting against the often strict national legal hierarchy.72 Interest-
ingly, this explanation holds for many EU member states, but not for Den-
mark (or for the other Nordic countries) where the lower courts leave it to the 
appellate courts and the Supreme Court to make almost all references.73 In 
our study (data from a survey of 380 Danish judges), the reluctance towards 
sending cases forward is quite clear. Some of the main results from this study 
can be summarised as follows74: 
 
What was the attitude (in 2006) of Danish judges towards making use of the 
preliminary reference system in the EU? 
It is not our duty, but the duty of the parties in a case to figure out 
whether there is a potential conflict between national law and EU 
law.  
60% 
Danish law is still the primary source of law and Danish judges 
are able to solve most cases without making use of EU law. 
30% 
Danish judges have only scarce knowledge of EU law. 21% 
A main reason for not sending cases to the ECJ is the advice of 
the Danish State attorney (“Kammeradvokaten”). 
69% 
Lower courts: The Danish Supreme Court should decide whether 
a preliminary ruling should be made or not. 
36% 
Acte Claire – if we consider EU law to be sufficiently clear we do 
not make a reference. 
57% 
Too long waiting time at the ECJ. 38% 
 
We will not go into great detail regarding the findings from this study here, 
but refer to other literature where the results of the study have been presented 
in more detail.75 There is, however, little doubt that the survey of the Danish 
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judges supports our cultural/democracy explanation quite substantially. There 
is an enormous unease and unfamiliarity with the European legal system that, 
in a Danish context, is further emphasised by the dominance of legal positiv-
ism and its “anti-rights” tradition, which creates suspicion towards the in-
creasing number of social and economic rights coming out of the internal 
market, but which is further emphasised with the Charter of Fundamental 
rights in the Treaty of Lisbon. In Denmark and the other Nordic countries, 
there is a firm conviction that rights which contain a distributional element 
should be decided by the politicians – not the courts. The problem is, howev-
er, that the international legal development – not only in the EU but also in 
the European Court of Human rights – pushes in the opposite direction. The 
losers if and when national courts refuse (deliberately or by other means) to 
protect fundamental rights – of any kind – will obviously be the citizens. 
Many things suggest, in other words, that in countries with majoritarian de-
mocracy, with little or no tradition of judicial review and active human rights 
protection by national courts, the impact of rights will be felt less strongly. 
The result may thus be an uneven rights protection in Europe. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The position taken in this paper is parallel to that of Martin Shapiro: ”judges 
make rather than simply discover law”.76 While this may be a trivial insight 
in any constitutional democracy context, it is still a rather provoking state-
ment to make in a Danish/Nordic political setting. In Denmark and the rest of 
the Nordic part of Europe, a wide but subtle consensus holds that the best 
way to run a democracy is to elevate parliament above the other branches of 
government, foster close links between the courts, the legislature and the ex-
ecutive branches of government, and only give courts scarce judicial review 
powers. Indeed, the successful Nordic welfare states have even regarded their 
corporatist structure, homogenous culture and more or less unconstrained par-
liaments as role models for other democracies and as eminent examples of 
good democratic principles, where ”the will of the people” is reflected in po-
litical majority decisions. There is no doubt that “the will of the people” is 
here to stay. The question that we raise is, however, whether it is always re-
flecting the will of the people when courts refrain from (or are hesitant) to 
protect fundamental rights – including setting aside majority decisions where 
the individual citizen (rather than the state apparatus) is wronged? Hjalte 
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Rasmussen’s research on the ECJ has spurred this debate in Denmark and far 
beyond, and though we may not agree entirely with his conclusions, we doubt 
that we would have entered the “law and politics” research realm had it not 
been for his provocative pen. 
 
